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ANNELISE RILES*

The Anti-Network: Private Global Governance, Legal
Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the State
Global private law has become the source of both anxiety and euphoria.Inherent in this fascination is the assumption that global private law threatens the legitimacy of the state by taking over its
functions through new techniques of governance. In this article, I
build upon research in one arena of global private governance, the
production of legal documentation for the global swap markets, to
challenge the most prominent assumptions about private law beyond
the state. I argue that ratherthan focusing on how global private law
is or is not an artifact of state power, a body of private norms, or a
coherent legal system, we should view global private law as a set of
institutions, actors, doctrines, ideas, documents, that is, as a specialized set of "knowledge practices." Viewed from this perspective, global
private law is not a radical departurefrom state law, but really more
of the same. Ultimately, I suggest that the "threat," if any, of global
private law for the state lies instead in the way it replicates the work of
the state in practical,mundane, and routine ways.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the late 1990s, a visitor to a Japanese derivatives trading floor
encountered a large open room full of metal desks and computer
screens. At most of these desks, traders hunched over their computers or shouted into their telephones. As the traders at their computers entered into a swap with traders at another bank in New York
or London, they scribbled the details of the trade onto a form, then
tossed it into a basket at the edge of their desk.
* Jack G. Clarke Professor of Far East Legal Studies, Cornell Law School. This
article draws upon ethnographic research conducted from 1996 to 2001 in Tokyo and
the United States for a forthcoming book, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reason in the
Global Markets. For careful criticism that substantially improved the piece, I am
grateful to Anna Gelpern, Ralf Michaels, Hiro Miyazaki, Jeff Rachlinski, Mathias Reimann, and audiences at the Private Law Beyond the State Conference, Hamburg, the
Communicating Legitimacy Conference, University of Chicago, and the 2007 Annual
Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Berlin. I thank Leticia Barrera for research assistance.
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But a few desks to one side were stacked high with documents
and large quantities of paper. Periodically, the people working behind
the stacks of documents collected these forms and returned to their
desks. Within eyesight of the traders and the manager of the derivatives team, these "documentation people" "papered the trades" as
people said. The employees at these desks produced confirmation
agreements and sent these to their counterparts at the other bank.
These confirmation documents adhered to a standard format,
such that the documentation person's principal task was simply to
complete the form, fax it, receive a similar fax from his or her counterpart at the other bank, and file it away. Occasionally, this person
might discover discrepancies-misunderstandings between the two
parties over the terms, for example-and then would refer these back
to the traders to resolve or contact their counterparts at the other
bank to resolve the dispute.
Global private law is now the source of both anxiety and euphoria. So-called global private law regimes-private in the sense that
they do not rely primarily on the legitimacy or the coercive power of
the state for their authority-now fascinate legal theorists for whom
the authority, legitimacy, and power of law has long been tethered to
the state.' But much of the conversation about global private law proceeds at some distance from the concrete moments, practices, and individuals that constitute global private governance regimes.
In this article, I build upon research in one arena of global private law, the production of legal documentation for the global swap
markets, to challenge the way both utopic and dystopic accounts describe private law beyond the state. I argue that these accounts stand
on a set of anthropological assumptions or claims-assertions about
what this private law actually is, from an insider's point of view,
about how it is interpreted and experienced "in the real world"which for the most part go unexamined, untheorized, and undefended
empirically. This matters because they also turn out to be, at the very
least, seriously incomplete.
In particular, I want to challenge, or at least complicate, three
views of the source of private law's legitimacy that figure prominently in both defenses and critiques of private law: the view that law
is an artifact of state power,2 the view that law enshrines a set of
norms,3 and the view that law is a coherent system of one kind or
1. See, e.g., RODNEY BRUCE HALL & THoMAs J. BIERSSTEKER, THE EMERGENCE OF
PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2002).

2. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8
(1927).
3. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight transl., 2d rev. &
enlarged German ed. 1967); HERBERT L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
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another. 4 In contrast, I will suggest that if one approaches these debates from the standpoint of the deceptively naive question, "what is
collateral, really, in the derivatives markets?" one begins to grasp a
view of law as something very different from a body of norms. Global
private law is also, I want to suggest, a set of routinized but highly
compartmentalized knowledge practices. I will shorthand this
description of global private law as the Anti-Network in order to contrast it to celebrations of global private law as an artifact of global
networks of various kinds. 5 Debates about the sources of private
law's legitimacy, I will suggest, need to be redirected to contend with
a more accurate picture of global private law.
My alternative description of private law beyond the state has
implications for the question of how and to what extent global private
law threatens the legitimacy of the state. Up to now, it has been
taken for granted by most proponents and critics alike that global
private law is something analogous to, but ultimately different from
state law.6 That is, it has been assumed that global private law
threatens the legitimacy of the state by taking over the functions of
the state through other (ostensibly more efficient, more accepted, or
more normatively defensible) means. In contrast, I argue that to the
extent that global private law poses a threat to the state it is not
because private law is somehow functionally analogous to, but qualitatively different from, state law. Rather, if one understands private
law beyond the state, as I do, as a set of institutions, actors, doctrines, ideas, material documents-of "knowledge practices"7 -one
begins to see remarkable similarities between the technical workings
of global private law and the nature of "state work." From this perspective, the "threat," if any, of global private law inheres instead in
4. See, e.g., KELSEN, supra note 3; RENP DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR
LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (1978). For a critique of this view of law, see
James Gordley, ComparativeLaw and Legal History, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 753 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2006).
5. See, e.g., RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS
(Richard P. Appelbaum, William L.F. Felstiner & Volkmar Gessner
eds., 2001); Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014
(1996-97). Analogous arguments are made about public international law. See, e.g.,
MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
6. For an account of how global private law might be analogous to state law, see
David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371 (2003). As Ralf Michaels
and Nils Jansen make plain, this assumption is more prevalent in the American literature on private law. In Germany, in contrast, a different conception of both private
law and of the state would hold that private law is in fact a part of state law. See Ralf
Michaels & Nils Jansen, PrivateLaw Beyond the State? Europeanization,Globalization, Privatization,54 AM. J. COMp. L. 843 (2006).
7. See Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on
the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973 (2005); ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
TRANSACTIONS
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the way it replicates and hence supersedes the state in practical,
mundane, routine ways.
In the sections that follow, I consider how a close-up description
of some moments in global private law-making, like the one with
which I began, might cause us to rethink the three most prominent
assumptions about global private law. I then conclude with some implications for how to think about whether and how global private law
might be "beyond the state."
II.

RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW AS AN ARTIFACT OF STATE POWER

In order to evaluate and specify the claims often made about
global private law, I turn to empirical observations conducted
through participant observation in one arena of private governance,
the self-regulation of the global swap markets through the posting of
collateral in Tokyo. The privately negotiated derivative markets are
intended to be the most private of markets. Unlike the futures and
options markets, swaps are not traded over an organized exchange.
The parties to a swap make their own rules, tailor their own contracts, and above all, privately bear the full risk that one or another
will not perform their obligations rather than placing their confidence in the exchange as an intermediary.8 Since securities regulation law was designed to regulate on-exchange activity, much swap
trading falls between the regulatory cracks.9 When disputes arise,
8. Ronit and Schneider usefully distinguish between private legal authority
which is delegated to the private law-making institution by a state, and private legal
authority which is autonomously claimed or built by non-state forces. Karsten Ronit
& Volker Schneider, Private Organizationsand Their Contribution to Problem-Solving in the Global Arena, in PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 1, 23 (Karsten
Ronit &Volker Schneider eds., 2000). However, they also overstate the distinction
where they fail to consider how the actions of private actors exercising regulatory
authority outside state action, may in fact constitute a delegation of authority from
the state.
9. At present, in the absence of extensive case law or regulatory actions by the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, there is some uncertainty about the implications of American securities laws
for the derivatives markets. The statutory language (concerning such issues as fraud
and insider trading) of the American securities laws is very broadly stated, and designed with the kinds of fraud in mind that would apply to manipulation of on-exchange trading. The case law, likewise, is closely linked to on-exchange transactions.
Although solid doctrinal arguments for the application of portions of the securities
laws to certain entities in the swap markets could be made, to date, neither the SEC
and the CFTC have shown a strong inclination to develop those arguments.
Nevertheless, the trading activities of swap partners are subject to various forms of
regulation, by virtue of these players' nature as regulated institutions. As Hal Scott
points out, however, this can lead to irregular levels of regulation in a market that
includes a variety of parties, including banks, securities firms, corporations, hedge
funds, governments and individuals:
As a formal matter, the derivatives activities of banks in the United States
are highly regulated by bank supervisors. This regulation involves detailed
examination of their activities as well as the capital requirements discussed
below ....However, there is no regulatory framework for supervision of the
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therefore, often parties' only option is to bring a lawsuit in a domestic
court under ordinary common or civil law claims such as breach of
contract, or fraud. 10 Since this is often impractical, the effect is that
the parties have relatively little recourse to the state to resolve their
internal problems. And this is precisely the appeal of these markets,
from participants' point of view.
When the documentation people described above were not at
work completing and dispatching confirmation forms, they huddled
behind piles of binders full of printed forms, dictionaries and pencils
in hand, talking on the telephone with colleagues at other banks as
they worked through the blanks in the forms. The most common
printed form was a standardized "master agreement"" that provides
the legal framework for all individual swap transactions between any
two banks. It defines key practices, rights and obligations, such as
the use of confirmation documents, or the procedures for cashing out
obligations in the event of the financial failure of one of the parties.
The form had been produced by representatives of important
players in the swap markets, working together under the auspices of
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).
Founded in 1985, ISDA is a private organization of more than 750
over-the-counter derivatives "dealers"-banks and securities firms
that are repeat players ("dealers") in the privately negotiated derivatives industry, the market for derivatives that are not traded through
an organized exchange.' 2 The master agreement is one of ISDA's
early and lasting achievements, and the production of this and other
standardized agreements is one of the principal functions of the
association. 13
derivatives activities of securities firms by the SEC or the Commodity Fu-

tures Trading Corporation (CFTC). Securities firms are not generally regu-

lated for safety and soundness except through capital requirements, and
unregistered affiliates of such firms dealing in swaps have not even been subject to capital requirements, until the SEC's proposal in 2003 in response to
the EU's Conglomerates Directive.
640
(2006).
Banks are subject to capitalization requirements under the terms of the Bank for
International Settlements, an international organization of bank regulators. There
are also disclosure and accounting rules that apply to public companies.
10. Most of the large lawsuits by users of derivatives against dealers have been
brought on common law and statutory grounds such as fraud and failure to disclose
material information, or have tested on the argument that the end user plaintiff was
prohibited from engaging in derivatives trading. SCOTT, supra note 9, at 663. See also
Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation 22 U. PA. J.
INT'L. ECON. L. 421 (2001).
11. International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., Master Agreement
(2002).
12. See International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., Membership,
http://www.isda.org/membership/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2006).
13. See JOSHUA COHN, ISDA MASTER AGREEMENTS: 1992 1987 VERSIONS COMPARED 2-13 (1992); INTERNATIONAL SwAPs AND DERIVATIVES AsSOCIATION, INC., USER'S
HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION
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Although the document standardizes many aspects of the practice of swap trading, it also allows for a certain amount of flexibility
and adaptation by its users through a "schedule" at the end in which
the parties can specify some of the details to their particular relationship, such as how payments are to be made. Hence the task of the
documentation people was to tailor the agreement to the needs of the
bank and its counterparties by filling in the blanks in the form.
At first blush, it may seem odd to focus on this kind of legal work
as an example of global private law. It has become commonplace in
sociolegal studies to focus instead on the "creative capacities of lawyers"14-in bringing clients together, inventing innovative solutions
to business problems, pushing the development of law, and hence
shaping the character of society. But the rote and repetitive work of
the documentation people, defined by its precision and attention to
detail rather than its creativity, and by its distance from legal theory,
points to another, too little acknowledged modality of legal work.
All this mundane activity is relevant to the nature of global private law and to the question of the extent to which it operates outside
or beyond the state in two senses. First, the ISDA master agreement
is the work of a powerful global private organization of the kind that
is now at the center of many debates about global private law. 15 Second, within the field of global derivatives trading, collateralization is
a legal technology that is paradigmatic of global private law solutions. Although collateral is an artifact of multiple kinds of national
law, 1 6 it is also a device for running an end-game around certain aspects of national law. In the event of bankruptcy, collateral gives
swap counterparties a mechanism other than the priority system of
national bankruptcy laws with its concerns for the interests of third
GUIDE TO THE

1992 ISDA MASTER

AGREEMENTS (1993); THE ISDA COLLATERAL Docu-

MENTATION WORKING GROUP, INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION,

INSTRUCTIONS TO EXTERNAL COUNSEL FORM
THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES DOCUMENTATION

2 (1999); CHRISTIAN A. JOHNSON, OVER(2000). ISDA produced the first version

of its Master Agreement in 1987. It revised it in 1992 to account for new kinds of

derivatives products developed in the intervening years.
14. Maureen E. Cain & Christine Harrington, Introduction, in LAWYERS IN A
POSTMODERN WORLD: TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION 1 (Maureen E. Cain & Christine Harrington eds., 1994).
15. See Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2006).
16. The rights of the collateral holder are a matter of national property, contract
and commercial law, and the requirements for giving and taking collateral (for creating a security interest in US parlance), are defined by and vary according to, the
terms of local statutory and common law. In the common and civil law traditions
alike, collateral has long been recognized as a special kind of property right. Collateral is a species of ius in re aliena in Roman Law, rights in others' property, which
"impose restrictions on the exercise of the rights of ownership by the owner." ADOLF
BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 27 (1953); ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE

185 (1959). In the individual states of the United States collateral is now

also understood as a species of commercial law enshrined and protected by statute-

by the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in each state.
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parties through which to resolve disputes.1 7 Collateral is a self-help
mechanism: in many jurisdictions the collateral holder may simply
keep the collateral to satisfy the debtor's obligations, without going to
court."' Collateral emerges as a solution to a practical problem of
transnational governance, therefore. The problem is that the terms of
the national bankruptcy laws of many of the countries in which derivatives trading occurs and the way these are interpreted and enforced
by national bankruptcy judges do not always suit the global derivatives industry because they do not prioritize their claims ahead of
others. 19
But collateral has many other advantages other than protection
against bankruptcy. For example, it becomes a vehicle for the parties
to privately steer their relationship through other turbulent waters:
the ISDA Master Agreement lists a number of "events" short of bankruptcy that trigger the collateral holder's right to close out its positions and use the collateral to satisfy any residual debts. 20 In this
respect, collateral shares certain functional features with other private commercial practices such as the uses of barter in international
trade, 2 1 or the rules commercial banks have developed for letter of
17. This fact is generally celebrated in the practitioner literature for derivatives
lawyers and by some scholars of derivatives law and decried by some scholars of bankruptcy law. See, e.g., Kimberly Summe, The European Union's CollateralReform Initiatives, 22 (6) COMPANY LAW 186 (2001). For criticisms from bankruptcy law scholars,
see Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy
Code: Why the Special Treatment? 22 YALE J. ON REG. 92 (2005); Ronald J. Mann,
Bankruptcy and the Entitlement of the Government: Whose Money is it Anyway?, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 993 (1995); Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Patternof Secured Credit,
110 HARv. L. REV. 625 (1997); Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, ContractingOut
of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1197 (2005).
18. Perhaps this is why a recent study of creditor rights in twelve transition economies found that the protections afforded creditors by collateral law correlate better
than the protections afforded creditors by bankruptcy law with increased levels of
lending. See Rainier Haselmann, Katharina Pistor & Vikrant Vig, How Law Affects
Lending, 285 Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper (2006), available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=846665.
19. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priorityof
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L. J. 857 (1996). As Carruthers, Babb and
Halliday show, bankruptcy law reform is part of the standard package of neoliberal
reforms instituted by countries around the world since the early 1990s. Bruce G. Carruthers, Sarah L. Babb & Terence C. Halliday, InstitutionalizingMarkets, or the Market for Institutions? Central Banks, Bankruptcy Law, and the Globalization of
FinancialMarkets, in THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 94,
105 (John L. Campbell & Ove Kaj Pedersen eds., 2001). These reforms in most cases
actually run counter to other neo-liberal reforms because by favoring reorganization
over liquidation they continue to protect debtors from creditors and to preserve a
sphere of national regulation from the reach of global capital. Carruthers, Babb &
Halliday, supra, at 116-18.
20. ISDA Master Agreement clause on bankruptcy.
21. See DALIA MARIN & MONIKA SCHNITZER, CONTRACTS IN TRADE AND TRANSITION:
THE RESURGENCE OF BARTER (2002). My thanks to Jing Leng for bringing this analogy
to my attention.
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credit practices. 2 2 We might say that collateral becomes, in a practical sense, a 2 kind
of private constitution for the parties' ongoing
3
relationship.
For some, claims about the global production of private law of
this kind become an urgent object of critique. These commentators
seek to show that the "technical" quality of global private law is in
fact highly politicized. 2 4 They renew and expand longstanding critiques of the public-private distinction in domestic law to demonstrate
that global private law25is always dependent upon state legal institutions for enforcement.
It is certainly true, as these critics assert, that collateral is an
artifact of multiple kinds of publicly created law. 26 Collateral transactions in the privately traded derivatives markets raise particular
problems of interface between multiple national legal systems, including problems of determining what law applies to any particular
28
collateral transaction. 2 7 The answers to these questions are murky,
22. Janet K. Levit, A Bottom-up Approach to InternationalLawmaking: The Tale
of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125 (2005).
23. See Annelise Riles, CollateralRelations: PropertyRelations in the Near Future
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). See also Mann, supra note 17. Note
that collateral does serve one important function, which is not "private" in nature: the
Bank for International Settlements capitalization requirements for banks allows
credit counterparties for collateralization in calculating capital adequacy requirements. Hence collateralizing transactions lowers capital adequacy requirements and
makes trading cheaper. See generally, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, A
NEW CAPITAL ADEQUACY FRAMEWORK (1999).

24. "Transnational merchant law, which is generally and mistakenly regarded in
purely technical, functional, and 'apolitical' terms, is ... a central and crucial mediator of domestic and global political/legal orders in that it enables the extraterritorial
application of national laws as well as the domestic application of transnational commercial law." CLAIRE A. CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANsNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 4 (2003).
25. These critics point out that the architecture of the transnational global private law regime is founded on the national private law of property and contract in
particular. Caroline Bradley emphasizes, for example, that contracts rely upon the
mechanisms of the state for enforcement and transform these in turn, such that the
"apparent sharp distinction between governmental and self-regulation soon breaks
down." Caroline Bradley, Private InternationalLaw-making for the FinancialMarkets, 29 FoRDHAM IN'L L.J. 127, 128 (2005).
26. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
27. Randall D. Guynn, Modernizing Securities Ownership, Transfer and Pledging
Law: A DiscussionPaper on the Need For InternationalHarmonizationwith Responding Comments by Professor James Steven Rogers (USA), Professor Kazuaki Sono (Japan) and Dr. Jirgen Than (Germany), 1996 I.B.A. CAPITAL MARKETS FORUM, Sec. on
Bus. L.; Randal D. Guynn & Margaret Tahyar, The Importance of Choice of Law and
Finality to PvP,Netting and CollateralArrangements,4(2) J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE
170 (1996).
Conflict of laws issues occupied the attention of ISDA legal staff I observed as much
as any other area of law. See RILES, supra note 7. Foreign holders of collateral feared
that in the event of the bankruptcy of a counterparty in Tokyo, for example, Japanese
bankruptcy courts might choose to apply Japanese law and they might not recognize
the priority of the collateral transaction over other creditors' claims. See Hasan-ho,
Law No. 71 of 1922. According to Hattori and Henderson, Japanese bankruptcy law
has a strongly territorialist orientation and Japanese courts therefore can adjudicate
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doctrinally arcane, and just as variable, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as is the law of collateral itself.2 9 Robert Wai terms these thorny
only those assets within Japanese territory. DAN F. HENDERSON & TAKAAKI HATTORI,
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, §11-27, §11-28, §11-29 (1983). However, case law diverges
from this "to the point where Japanese bankruptcy proceedings affect foreign assets,
and foreign bankruptcy proceedings affect assets in Japan." HENDERSON & HATTORI,
supra, § 11-28.
28. The transnational nature of collateral transactions goes beyond the mere (but
important) fact that the parties to a swap are often incorporated in different jurisdictions. Collateral may be posted in different currencies, or in the form of government
bonds issued by different governments. The collateral usually is held with intermediaries often incorporated in yet other jurisdictions, with places of business in
still other locales. These intermediaries book the collateral in computerized ledgers
maintained on servers that may be located yet elsewhere in the world. And when, as
is permitted under the law of some countries, the pledgee (the party which receives
the collateral) "repledges" the collateral to yet another party to satisfy its own obligations, which then repledges it again, one gets a picture of a constant global movement
of collateral in and out of accounts in many jurisdictions.
29. Patrick J. Borchers, Choice of Law Relative to Security Interests and Other
Liens in InternationalBankruptcies, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 165 (1998).
On questions relating to the validity of the collateral, some jurisdictions, following
classical private international law rules, look to the law of the place where the securities are held. But doctrine in this area developed to deal with tangible forms of property, such as paper securities. Where "collateral" is in actuality a set of numbers in a
computerized account, or in multiple accounts, maintained by multiple intermediaries, the question of where it "is" for the purpose of this analysis is almost
metaphysically unanswerable. One resolution adopted by some jurisdictions (including the U.S. in the wake of recent revisions to the UCC, as concerns certain issues) is
to look to the law of the place where the intermediary whose account the collateral is
held with is located. Richard Potok, Legal Certaintyfor Securities Held as Collateral,
18 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 12 (1999). Recent revisions to Article 8 and 9 specifically take the
UCC global by addressing questions of choice of law and tailoring the terms to the
character of cross-border transactions:
The local law of the securities intermediary's jurisdiction, as specified in subsection
(e), governs:
(1) acquisition of a security entitlement from the securities intermediary;
(2) the rights and duties of the securities intermediary and entitlement holder arising
out of a security entitlement;
(3) whether the securities intermediary owes any duties to an adverse claimant to a
security entitlement; and
(4) whether an adverse claim can be asserted against a person who acquires a security
entitlement from the securities intermediary or a person who purchases a security
entitlement or interest therein from an entitlement holder. UCC § 8-110 (b). See also
U.C.C. art. 9 (1999); 3 U.L.A. 9, 9 (Supp. 1999) (effective July 1, 2001). In some respects, at least, the European Union follows a similar approach. See, Parliament and
Council Directive 2002/47 on financial collateral arrangements art. 8, O.J. (L 168) 4344.
Another approach (adopted in the U.S. by UCC Article 9 with respect to certain issues
relating to the validity of the security interest) is to look to the law of the location of
the debtor. Ryan E. Bull, Operationof the New Article 9 Choice of Law Regime in an
InternationalContext, 78 TEx. L. REV. 679 (2000). For many (but not all) legal issues
surrounding validity, Japanese courts look to the law of the place where the securities
were issued. Hideki Kanda, Japan, in CRoss BORDER COLLATERAL: LEGAL RISK AND
THE CONFLICT OF LAW 366 (Richard Potok ed., 2002). And this says nothing about
what law would govern the question of the priority of the collateral holder's claim, in
the event of bankruptcy. The question of how different national courts with jurisdiction over the assets of a bankrupt company with transnational contacts should coordi-
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doctrinal problems "touchdown points" in the relationship between
global private governance and national law-points at which the efforts of private organizations such as ISDA to achieve "lift-off" from
30
national regimes comes to rest on national law itself.
But this critique of global private governance is certainly not
news to the proponents of global private governance institutions like
ISDA. The legal experts with whom I worked understood full well
that the private law of collateral is always only a partial global solution to their local legal problems. 3 1 They were intimately aware, for
example, that the terms of any collateral agreement must satisfy national requirements for creating a valid and enforceable security interest in order for the lender to be able to use the collateral, or again,
that national bankruptcy law must recognize the primacy of the interest of "secured creditors" over other creditors if the collateral
agreement is to have force once the debtor has declared bankruptcy.
In fact, it was at these junctures that the legal actors I studied labored-these constraints created the legal work for them to do.
For example, where the terms in ISDA's standardized documents
conflict with the norms enshrined in national statutory or judgemade law, ISDA actively works to supplant or change the latter so
that it conforms to the former. ISDA hires local lawyers to investigate
discrepancies between the terms of ISDA documents and national
law, and where necessary, to lobby national governments to change
national law to either conform to the terms of the Master Agreement

nate, and when they should defer to the law of another jurisdiction, remains very
much unresolved. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking InternationalInsolvency: The Neglected Role of Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory, 36 STAN.J. INT'L L. 23 (2000).
30. See Robert Wai, TransnationalLiftoff and JuridicalTouchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private InternationalLaw in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 209 (2002), Wai adapts the legal realist and critical legal studies insight that technical legal issues (such as here, which law should apply) are always
already forms of political compromise and hence open for reopening as tools of political change. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY-ANTI-NECESSITARIAN
SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY

(2001). Wai and others suggest

that Private International Law is uniquely suited to address the particular problems
posed by the global private law such as overlapping legal regimes, or "regulatory
gaps" where no particular state regulates a certain practice. Id.
31. As one such lawyer writes,
The ISDA Agreement should not be perceived as a law unto itself. The fundamental legal principles of contract law, company law, trust law, the law of
torts and the law of insolvency, etc., still apply, as appropriate, in circumstances where an ISDA Agreement becomes the subject-matter of litigation.
From a business standpoint, the significance of national boundaries has decreased considerably in the last decade. However, it remains the case that,
from a legal standpoint, national boundaries continue to be very important,
not least in the context of insolvency.
Agnes Foy, The ISDA Master Agreement-Managing Legal Risk: Jurisdictionsand
Counter-parties,6 COM. L. PRAc.104 (1999).
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or explicitly declare the ISDA documents enforceable. 3 2 Partly at the
urging of ISDA, and with active input from the organization, several
transnational bodies are busy creating substantive legal rules concerning collateral that would apply in multiple jurisdictions and supersede national law. ISDA has pressed for the creation of a treatyperhaps the ultimate example of global state law-that would mandate that national judges respect private parties' right to choose
whatever law they wish to have applied to their collateral agreements. 33 In response to lobbying from ISDA,34 the European Union
has adopted a Directive on Financial Collateral Arrangements defining how security interests are to be created in EU Member States,
and the rights of holders of collateral. 3 5 And ISDA has also worked
with UNIDROIT, the international body devoted to unifying private
law globally, 3 6 on a Convention on Harmonised Substantive Rules re32. In the United States, intensive lobbying on the part of ISDA has resulted in
important revisions of New York state law, the UCC, and the national bankruptcy
law, and has averted other proposed regulation opposed by ISDA. The European
Union also has responded to ISDA lobbying by producing a directive on collateral
supported by ISDA. In Tokyo, likewise, ISDA has an elaborate system of committees
in place to address legal reforms as well as high-level contacts in all branches of the
Japanese bureaucracy. The representatives of even the foreign banks at ISDA Tokyo
meetings are almost exclusively Japanese employees of these foreign banks, graduates of top universities with connections to former teachers and classmates in the
bureaucracy and on the bench.
33. On December 13, 2002, the Hague Conference on Private International Law
adopted a Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary, available at http://www.hcch.netlindexen.php?act=
conventions.text&cid=72. This convention, a product of intensive lobbying by ISDA
and other global commercial groups, affirms that if the agreement between the intermediary and the custodian of the security specifies which law should apply, that law
applies as long as it bears a reasonable relationship to the transaction. The first order
principle of the convention is the freedom of the account holder and intermediary (but
not the pledgor and pledgee) to choose the applicable law by contract. Groups such as
ISDA participated actively in the drafting of the convention. The Hague Conference
official with primary responsibility for its drafting defends this freedom of contract
principle on grounds that states have an interest in economic development, and in
supporting "certainty in the marketplace promoted by the Convention. This is not a
case of private versus public interest. The Convention itself represents a clear decision by the state that the public interest resides in enforcement of the Convention's
rule. " Harry C. Sigman & Christophe Bernasconi, Myths about the Hague Convention
Debunked, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 2005, at 31. The convention was concluded July 5,
2006, but it has not yet come into force. Even if the question of which law governs the
collateral agreement is ultimately settled by treaty, this will not resolve the question
of the relationship between the law of collateral and national bankruptcy law: it will
not preclude a Japanese bankruptcy court for example from recognizing the collateral
as valid under New York law as specified by the CSA, but then applying Japanese
bankruptcy law to the question of whether the collateral holder should be able to keep
the collateral after a bankruptcy filing.
34. James Coiley, New Protections for Cross-Border Collateral Arrangements:
Summary and Analysis of Draft E.U. Directive on FinancialCollateral, 16 (5) J. INT'L
BANKING L.119 (2001).
35. Parliament and Council Directive 2002/47 on financial collateral arrangements, O.J. (L 168) 43. On the reasons for EU regulation, see Summe, supra note 17.
36. UNIDROIT, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, is
"a global legal organization with 59 Member States whose laws include all the key
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garding Intermediated Securities to be adopted by individual nations
as international law.37 ISDA members aim not only to create substantive legal rights through private contracts, but to influence the
shape of those rights as they find expression in state law. 3 8
What Wai views as "touchdown points," then, were for my informants, projects-problems that demanded creative work, political
mobilization, technical skill, and considerable devotion. What is interesting about typical artifacts of private global governance such as
collateral, when viewed in practice, is not whether they are truly private (and outside the purview of the state), or actually public (and
within state control), but rather how the impulse, the fantasy of a
private market engenders particular kinds of practical projects, particular registers of engagement between lawyers working for private
parties under the umbrella of transnational organizations such as
ISDA, national and international law-makers, judges, and
regulators.
Moreover, the view that private law is just a pass through to
state power overlooks the role of the materiality of ISDA forms in the
global private governance regime. The rhetorical force of the argument that judges will wreak chaos on the markets if they fail to honor
market practices is perhaps different because of the sheer physical
ubiquity of these documents. For example, in the early 1990s, the
ISDA Master Agreement's procedures for closing out the agreement
in the case of the bankruptcy of one party, and its delineation of the
rights of the other party in such a scenario, arguably conflicted with
the substantive rules and procedures of many national bankruptcy
regimes. However, interviews suggest that the widespread use of the
Master Agreement-the physical existence of thousands of such
signed documents-transformed the question of what to do about
substantive legal rules that industry members found unfavorable, a
policy question, into a far more general and technical question of the
enforceability of this contract in each national jurisdiction.
systems of financial law around the world." UNIDROIT, THE UNIDROIT STUDY
GROUP ON HARMONISED SUBSTANTIVE RULES REGARDING INDIRECTLY HELD SECURITIES,
POSITION PAPER 5 (2003).
37. The UNIDROIT Secretariat submitted a preliminary draft on December 23,
2004 which was further negotiated by a committee of experts in May, 2005.
UNIDROIT, PRELIMINARY DRAFr CONVENTION ON HARMONIZED SUBSTANTIVE RULES
REGARDING INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES (2005). See also International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Comment on Preliminary Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary (Hague
Convention on Private International Law ed., 2002).
38. Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati point to a different kind of interaction between
standardized contracts and public law: they argue from the case of sovereign debt
contracts that standardized contracts can serve as "public symbols"-ways public authorities signal about political events. Anna Gelpern & G. Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol
in Private Contract:A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627 (2006).
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The sociological fact that material documents matter admittedly
flies in the face of the longstanding assertion that the paper of the
contract means nothing in itself, that it is the agreement between the
parties, and not the document, that matters. 39 But commentators
have begun to pay attention to the consequences of standardized contracts such as ISDA documents for the authority, legitimacy and
power of privatized law in a global market. 40 Some even celebrate
these standardized contracts as examples of "the changing paradigm
41
of international commercial law" towards "privatized law-making."
And indeed, for ISDA staff and members, collateral documents are
crucial technologies of private transnational legal infrastructure-devices through which particular technical, institutional, political, legal, and economic arrangements gain solidity and durability. 4 2 This
is not to say that judges do not understand that a privately created
document is legally meaningful only to the extent that a state-sanctioned court holds it to be enforceable. But what empirical observation of private law in action demonstrates is that in order for the
transaction to "work" all sides (parties and judges alike) must be both
aware of the "truth" that state power lies behind all private legal regimes and able to momentarily forget this fact to immerse themselves
the practical and technical day to day experience of doing private
3
law. 4
III.

RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW AS A SYSTEM OF NORMS

This brings me to my second target. For proponents and critics of
private law alike, global private governance regimes take on the le39. See e.g., Stewart Macaulay, ElegantModels, EmpiricalPicturesand the Complexities of Contract, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 507 (1976-1977); STEWART MACAULAY,
JOHN KIDWELL, WILLIAM WITHFORD & MARC GALANTER, CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION

(1995).

40. Schmitthoff long ago identified "the contribution which standard contract
forms and general conditions of business . . . can make to the unification or
harmonisation of the law of international trade." Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Unification or Harmonisationof Law by Means of Standard Contracts and General Conditions, 17 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 551 (1968). He emphasized the aura of "realism" about
this "unifying activity" owing to the fact that the rules are created by the business
community rather than by government. Id. at 555. Ralf Michaels has recently analyzed these issues as a matter of the accommodation of global private law regimes by
the state. Michaels usefully dissects these forms of accommodation into three distinct
kinds, all of which enter into play in standardized contracts-deference, incorporation, and delegation. Ralf Michaels, The Re-statement of Non-State Law: The State,
Conflict of Laws and the Challenge of Global Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209

(2005).

41. KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA
(1999).
42. See BRUNO LATOUR, LA FABRIQUE DU DROIT : UNE ETHNOGRAPHIE DU CONSEIL

(2002).
43. On this "as if' quality of law, see HANs VAIHINGER,

D'ETAT

A SYSTEM OF THE THEORETICAL,
Ogden trans., 1925).

THE PHILOSOPHY OF "As IF":
PRACTICAL AND RELIGIOUS FICTIONS OF MANKIND (C.K.
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gitimacy of "law" by virtue of the fact that they embody a set of particular norms.44 These norms are imagined to be analogous, both in
their coercive power and their legitimacy, to the authority of the
state, within the purview of the particular community or market sector where they apply.
For the proponents of private law, the rise of private norm-making organizations is a cause for celebration because of the efficiencies
and creative regulatory solutions that such private organizations are
deemed to provide. There is even an aura of democratization in
phrases like "bottom-up lawmaking" used to describe the global production of private law norms.45 Implicit in or running alongside this
view is often a mild materialist claim that a revolution in information
technologies and in the character of capitalism has occurred, resulting in a largely inevitable trend toward the demise of state law-making authority. 46 But the view of global private law as a regime of
norms is equally pervasive among those who critique the delegation
of state power to global private authorities. The theorist of globalization Saskia Sassen for example laments that we now face, "a normative transformation in the [sense] of a privatizing of certain capacities
47
for making norms."
The notion that communities-in this case communities of global
market players-solve their problems and order their behavior by
creating norms is a longstanding tenet of functionalist anthropology
and one that has had an important shelf life in twentieth century
legal scholarship. 4 s In some versions of this dogma, one particularly
prevalent in law and society scholarship, social networks serve the
same kinds of results as state coercion, and social norms are the prod44. Klaus Peter Berger for example writes that business people "create their own
law through the drafting, use and refinement of general conditions of trade, standardized contracts and other clauses as well as the development of practices and usages,
elevating them from regional to world-wide customs." BERGER, supra note 41, at 2728. In contrast, the fact that these global norms are "spontaneously generated" and
not the product of purposeful law-making activity has led one commentator to doubt
whether they are coherent enough to constitute a source of law. See Roy Goode, Rule,
Practice,and Pragmatismin TransnationalCommercial Law, 54 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
539, 547 (2005).
45. See Levit, supra note 22.
46. Philip G. Cerny, Embedding Global FinancialMarkets, in PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 59 ( Karsten Ronit & Volker Schneider eds., 2000); DAVID A.
WESTBROOK, CITY OF GOLD: AN APOLOGY FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM IN A TIME OF DISCONTENT (2003).

47. Saskia Sassen, De-nationalizedState Agendas and Private Norm-Making, in
61 (Karl Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004).
48. Most recently, Paul Schiff Berman has called for borrowing once again from
the insights of anthropology and cognate fields in the study of globalization to afford
'a more nuanced idea of how people actually form affiliations, construct communities,
and receive and develop legal norms." Paul S. Berman, From International Law to
Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 485, 489 (2005).
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
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ucts of social networks. 4 9 In other versions-ones influenced by
Hayekian social thought-the spontaneous quality of norms makes
them both more efficient and more just. 50
The deeper assumption here is that norms and communities are
more "real" than the law of the state because they form a context for
the law of the state, and context is always more stable and determinate than text.5 1 The socio-legal literature, for example, seeks to
demonstrate time and again that the real source of security of contract in the global marketplace is not legal institutions but private
networks built on relations of trust among global elites. 52 To the extent that these regimes are read as systems of private norms, they
appear as self evidently more real, more legitimate, more innovative,
more complex, closer to the ground, than the state itself.
49. Many political scientists and lawyers see private norms as more "complex"
and "heterodox" than state law because each industry makes its own norms and hence
the result is a pluralistic legal order with no clear hierarchies of norms. See Cerny,
supra note 46, at 60. In place of national legal systems, these theorists see coexisting,
fragmented, sometimes integrated, sometimes conflicting normative orders with different degrees of access to coercive authority-of the state and other coercive forces in
society. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, for example, states that "a legal field is a constellation of different legalities (and illegalities) operating in local, national and global
time-spaces." BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE:
LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 85

(2002).

In a previous project on global public law, I have critiqued this propensity to see networks everywhere and to view these as inherently normatively good. ANNELISE RILES,
THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000).
50. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE

Dis-

PUTES (1991).
51. See generally RILES, supra note 49.
52. A longstanding insight of the law and society literature is that the mundane
activity of "repeat players"-insiders such as the major players in the global private
derivatives markets-does not simply comply with, but rather produces, legal regimes. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9(1) LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974). Edelman, Uggen and Erlanger
argue in the context of the regulation of organizations, that "The meaning of law ...
unfolds dynamically across organizational, professional, and legal fields." Lauren B.
Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: GrievanceProcedures as Rational Myth, 105(2) AM. J. Soc. 406 (1999). Specifically, both socio-legal studies and the social studies of finance have emphasized the
way social relations can substitute for the impossible demands for information required to effectively police one's agreements in the global marketplace. The argument
is that small "clubs" of actors come to know and trust one another intimately, and to
develop a rich network of norms governing their transactions, such that very locally
defined social relations of trust and informal norms come to substitute for both financial knowledge and legal norms. MITCHEL Y. ABOLAFIA, MAKING MARKETS: OPPORTUNISM AND RESTRAINT ON WALL STREET (1996); CAITLIN ZALOOM, OUT OF THE PITS:
TRADERS AND TECHNOLOGY FROM CHICAGO TO LONDON (2006). Global legal norms and
institutions are created through the efforts of individual legal actors, working on particular projects in the service of their very locally defined interests based upon their
social networks-their personal career interests, the interests of their families or
class, or of their firms and organizations-to forge alliances with others. YVES
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996)..
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From this vantage point, it is easy enough to see why global private governance regimes would seem to pose such a threat to state
legitimacy. But does this description of global private law as a collection of norms, and of organizations such as ISDA as norm creators,
accurately capture the knowledge work at issue, or does it obscure as
much as it reveals? From an empirical perspective, there is something amiss in the descriptions of global private governance as alternative normative communities busy codifying their norms in
standardized documents.
In legal terms, collateral is a body of doctrines and theories, a
specialized set of property rights. In Tokyo, legal academics, and
qualified lawyers working closely with them inside prestigious law
firms, read and wrote academic articles about the meaning of the sections of the Civil Code governing collateral relations, and they applied these to collateral in the derivatives markets in legal opinions
drafted on behalf of their clients (in particular the foreign banks).
Government bureaucrats studied foreign laws, debated law reform
projects, drafted new laws, and implemented existing ones.
But as explained above, in the financial markets, one first encounters "collateral" as a mountain of specific pre-printed forms that
must be completed and filed before trading can begin, and of confirmation documents that must be exchanged after each trade. What
ISDA members, through the battalions of documentation people I
studied were busy making were not rules, not norms, not sources of
law, but documents.
Legal scholars have read such contracts for their meaning-they
have treated them as texts that entextualize particular sets of
norms. 53 But such forms are often meant not to be read, but to be
completed. That is, ISDA documents are technologies that compel a
very specific kind of activity, form-filling. 54 ISDA form is a script for a
particular kind of collaboration between two parties-the documentation person at Bank A and the documentation person at Bank B.
53. Two recent empirical papers present material that hints at trouble for the
view of standardized contracts as mere vessels of narrative meaning. Choi and Gulati
make the interesting claim that some terms of boilerplate often have no clear meaning even among industry members. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as
Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (2006). Boilerplate does not necessarily enshrine
clearly accepted norms, in other words. Unfortunately, rather than push the standardized contracts literature to come to terms with this empirical insight, the authors
seek to do away with the trouble this finding causes by proposing a theory of interpretation of these documents that would read industry norms back in. Likewise, Gelpern
and Gulati present a fascinating account of how a clause in a standardized sovereign
debt contacts came to be changed: despite the extensive work devoted to this change,
industry participants insisted that the change mattered little in the end. Gelpern &
Gulati, supra note 38.
54. Don Brenneis, Reforming Promise, in DOCUMENTS: ARTIFACTS OF MODERN
KNOWLEDGE 41 (Annelise Riles ed., 2006); Hirokazu Miyazaki, Documenting the Present, in DOCUMENTS: ARTIFACTS OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE 206 (Annelise Riles ed.,
2006).
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ISDA documents work as technologies for engaging in a communicative routine. The routine consists of a set of material practices of document production, filing, and exchange-practices that in turn call
for further practices, further documents.5 5 In this sense, the document makes possible a set of exchanges defined by the particular
5 6 that I would like to
kind of knowledge at issue, technical knowledge
57
claim as a form of global private governance.
Crucially, the ISDA form does not presume, as in the socio-legal
and private global governance literatures, that documentation people
are members of a tight-knit "club," people who know and trust one
55. Annelise Riles, [Deadlines]:Removing the Brackets on Politicsin Bureaucratic
and AnthropologicalAnalysis, in DOCUMENTS: ARTIFACTS OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE 71
(Annelise Riles ed., 2006). In a somewhat analogous way, Karen Knorr-Cetina and
Urs Bruegger describe traders' visual experience of the market through the formatting of a computer screen such as the Bloomberg terminal as a kind of "postsocial"
form of relationality. Karen Knorr Cetina & Urs Bruegger, Traders'Engagement with
Markets: A Postsocial Relationship, 19(5/6) THEORY CULTURE & Soc'Y 161 (2002). As
Mariana Valverde puts it, it demands that we ask "not about the content of claims but
about process and flow-about how actors pick through documents or discourses and
cobble together new governing machines that recycle old bits in new ways." Mariana
Valverde, Authorizing the Production of Urban Moral Order: Appellate Courts and
Their Knowledge Games, 39(2) LAW & Soc'y REV. 419 (2005).
56. How are these deals legally accomplished in the absence of a fully developed framework of global law? The key to this lies in legal work, and the role
of legal work in transnational transactions. The term "legal work" is used
here to mean technical work, with and on the law, undertaken usually but
not necessarily by lawyers, in specific transactions for specific clients.
Doreen McBarnet, TransnationalTransactions:Legal Work, Cross-BorderCommerce
and Global Regulation, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION AND
POWER DISPARITIES 98, 98-99 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002).
57. One of the features of the global private law regime, in the eyes of commentators, is its "technical" quality. That is, the markets at issue are taken themselves to be
highly specialized and "of a technical and complex nature." Pedro Gustavo Teixeira,
Public Governance and the Co-operative Law of TransnationalMarkets: The Case of
FinancialRegulation, in PUBLIC GOvERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 305, 311
(Karl Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004); which accords special power to insiders and
professionals:
We find that the ability of professions to exercise lawmaking power in an
area such as bankruptcy law increases significantly when agenda setting,
inventing and drafting new laws, and legislative politicking takes place underneath the wider horizon of political debate. Politics take place at two
levels: when it is above the political horizon, it activates all the forces and
counterforces of the political system and thus imports into technical or financial law reform a much wider set of issues than pertain to the substantive
and administrative core of the reform itself; this also activates classic patterns of oppositionalism. When it is below the political horizon, it is not
widely debated; it does not stir public controversy; it does not activate usual
interest group polarities and conflicts; and it does not trigger instinctive
party political opposition. Below the horizon, professions can exert much
more influence, and they do so characteristically by insisting that their contributions are technical, expert, and neutral and thus do not warrant the

scrutiny that might otherwise focus upon them.
Bruce G. Carruthers & Terence C. Halliday, Professionals in Systemic Reform of
Bankruptcy Law: The 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the English Insolvency Act
1986, 74 AM. BANKR. L. J. 35, 74 (2000).
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another. 58 The documentation people I worked with did not belong to
any such "club"-their counterparties were simply anonymous voices
on the other end of a telephone, or people on the other end of the fax
or e-mail.5 9 This routine is made possible not by a set of shared
norms, but by a given set of aesthetic criteria-printedforms are distinguished from other genres of communication such as letters, legal
opinions, or e-mail messages by their very rigid aesthetic standards. 60 These aesthetic criteria in turn demand that the users of the
forms engage in very specific forms of behavior: one chooses the law
that applies to the ISDA master agreement by circling the proper
word; one delineates who is the responsible contact person for the
agreement by completing the relevant box. The form is not set out to
be read; it is presumed that the "users" (the term is significant) will
jump to the blanks and complete them, most likely in the order they
appear. The collaboration made possible by the printed form is certainly consequential, in other words, but it is also normatively and
socially thin.6 1 In other words, "collateral" is not just an artifact of
private networks and associated normative communities but a technology, and a technical form of agency, of its own.
Many law and society scholars will insist that the claim that the
law functions independently of social context is nothing but a phantasmic assertion or worse, a political obfuscation. 62 My own first entree into the larger significance of collateral for a theory of legal
knowledge came from what I took to be just such obfuscation: my informants' manifest lack of interest in the subject of disputes. As a
legal anthropologist, I am predisposed to take an interest in disputes
and cultures of disputing, and so I naturally peppered my informants
with questions about how disputes among counterparties over the
terms of a swap get resolved. Given the notional amounts at stake, I
reasoned that these disputes must occupy considerable effort and energy. To my dismay, however, these questions elicited little interest
on the part of the documentation people I knew. "We just work these
things out," I was told again and again, with a standard shrug, before
people turned the conversation back to subjects of greater concern to
them. When, confident that people were hiding something, I pointed
58. See Levit, supra note 22, at 131.
59. One could say that the users of ISDA forms share a set of institutional prac-

tices, codes of behavior, by virtue of the fact of their employment in particular kinds of
institutions (e.g., banks and securities firms). But this simply restates the argument
here: ISDA forms are one important material instantiation of this institutional

practice.
60. Annelise Riles, Introduction:In Response, in DOCUMENTS: ARTIFACTS OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE 1 (Annelise Riles ed., 2006).
61. See also NIKLAs LuHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Elizabeth King &
Martin Albrow trans., 1985).
62. Susan Silbey has produced a detailed critical retrospective of this argument.
Susan Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCIENCE 323 (2005).
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out that the ISDA CSA documents provide for a quite elaborate set of
procedures to be followed in the event of a dispute, people laughed.
No one actually followed those procedures, I was told. Rather, people
tended to have in mind a range within which, should a dispute arise,
they would simply go along and not contest. If the disputed amount
was outside that range, they would simply come to some agreement,
usually by splitting the difference. At one point, one informant told
me, it was suggested that a more formal dispute resolution mechanism should be set up, but the idea was abandoned because "nobody
wanted to serve on it." There are also remarkably few examples of
formal litigation among swap parties.
To grasp the theoretical significance of this fact, compare collateral with a favorite subject in the theory of global private law, international commercial arbitration. Arbitration is theoretically
interesting for socio-legal scholars because we can see in it private
actors banding together, elaborating their own dispute resolution system, developing over time their own body of adjudicative norms, and
increasingly, garnering state approval for these norms. That is, arbitration is interesting in a somewhat obvious way, because it is quite
explicitly an analog to state law, an alternative to state law with all of
state law's functional elements-a regime of norms, a set of procedures, a set of problems (disputes). But collateral works according to
a quite different logic. In theory at least, if a transaction is collateralized, there is no need for dispute resolution in the first place. The
dispute is already resolved, already collateralized, so to speak, before
it ever comes into existence. And just because things do not turn out
so neatly in practice does not mean that we should ignore the fantasy,
the ambition, the hope of collateral.
From this point of view, we might view collateral arrangements
as a form of law that aims to be both the obviation of dispute resolution as well as its apotheosis. Indeed, collateral is difficult to be seen
as a "topic" of legal theory precisely because its modus operandi is not
at all alternative and analogous to standard law, with its disputes
resolved according to norms enshrined in legal processes.
If this point is difficult to accept from a socio-legal point of view
in which law is always a (less legitimate) artifact of (more authentic)
social relations, it is, I think, very much part of the lawyer's common
sense understanding of the law. In practitioners' own ideology, collateral is as a way of setting limits on the messy complexities of a global
market, a way of obviating the need for knowledge and trust, an alternative to developing shared private norms. One could say that in
fact collateral is the precise opposite of social norms. That is, collateral aspires to make it possible for global actors to deal with one another without trust, without shared norms, without a thick web of

HeinOnline -- 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 623 2008

624

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 56

personal relations or an elaborate alternative system of dispute
resolution.
IV.

RETHINKING THE VIEW OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW AS A
COHERENT OR STANDARDIZED SYSTEM

I have argued thus far that critiques of global private law as an
artifact of state power miss the extent to which that the interface
between private authority and state power is itself the very basis for
the flurry of activity that is global private law, from an empirical vantage point. And on the other side of the ledger, I have argued that
utopic and dystopic accounts of global private law that see in it a
spontaneous and more legitimate set of norms fail to account for the
fact that private law is not just a set of norms but a set of knowledge
practices. I now want to take on one last source of global private law's
legitimacy, the question of its coherence-analytical or sociological.
This brings us to a conversation about practices of standardization.
The standardized quality of law-making has recently captured
the attention of law and economics and law and society scholars
alike. Where law and economics scholars see cost savings, 63 socio-legal scholars see the production of new legal regimes through the routinization of work and professional roles. 64 Standardization is also a
central concern of science and technology studies scholars for whom
standards produce epistemic networks-collections of projects, associated ideas and technologies for working on them, and ultimately,
65
the "truths" that emerge from these.
63. A core insight of the law and economics literature on standardized contracts is
that standardization serves the important economic function of reducing the transaction costs associated with producing new contracts, such as researching the law and
drafting the terms of the contract ("learning benefits"). Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Standardizationand Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719-20 (1997). For example, Kahan and

Klausner point out that standardized contracts also reduce litigation costs because
they deploy terms that have already been vetted in court. Id.
64. For example, Mark Suchman, working in the domestic American context of
the development of intellectual property law in Silicon Valley, draws attention to
mundane practices of contract production as one source, among others, of the creation
of new legal norms. Suchman points to "a significant but often overlooked aspect of
industrial governance: the routinization of transactional practices within a developing organizational community." MARK SUCHMAN, THE CONTRACTING UNIVERSE: LAW

FIRMs

AND THE EVOLUTION OF VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING IN SILICON VALLEY

2

(2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). Likewise, Doreen McBarnet
and Michael Powell argue, for the case of international tax lawyers and corporate

takeover law respectively, that law is the artifact of the accumulation of individual
legal projects and of solutions developed by lawyers operating separately in the service of their clients. See Doreen McBarnet, Legal Creativity:Law, Capital and Legal
Avoidance, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD: TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION

73 (Maureen E. Cain & Christine B. Harrington eds., 1994); McBarnet, supra note;
Michael J. Powell, ProfessionalInnovation - CorporateLawyers And PrivateLawmaking, 18 (3) LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 423 (1993).

65. Science studies scholars have argued that scientific truths and economic markets are artifacts of networks of theories, ideas, people, institutions, machines, and
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Built into all of these arguments is the notion of a network of
actors who share certain abilities to signal to one another and to
learn from one another. 6 6 In this sense, the standardization vocabulary is a richer and more empirical way of arguing for what legal
scholars used to call the coherence of law. By discovering networks of
material and conceptual kinds, scholars are able to show that the
"stuff' of documents, of doctrine, of mundane legal knowledge actually "adds up" to a larger whole, something of much greater significance. A document gains theoretical significance by virtue of its
status as a node in a larger standardized network of forms of expertise. A network in turn gains theoretical significance by virtue of its
the accumulation of concrete practices, all related into a
status as
67
whole.
This vision of the world not as a system of states but as a myriad
networks-whether these be networks of economic actors or networks
of doctrines and documents-is an attractive argument for the legitimacy and authority of private law beyond the state. 68 But does the
claim that the disparate and mundane bits of legal knowledge add up
to a new kind of whole do justice to the perspective of the actors
themselves? Where the theorists may see connections everywhere,
the actors involved are just as likely to see breaks, divides, a lack of
connections. To take their perspective seriously is to ponder the ways
often nothing in particular is being "constructed" by these practicesthe way they do not add up to a coherent whole.
First, as any comparative lawyer would immediately understand, the standardization of ISDA documents did not in any way
guarantee their transnational transplantability. 69 Rather, the transother "actants"-nodes of animate and inanimate agency. See BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY
(1987); ARAMIS OR, THE LOVE OF TECHNOLOGY (1996). More recently, Latour has extended the analysis to law in his study of the French Conseil d'Etat. See LATOUR,
supra note 42. Documents in this understanding are "immutable, presentable, readable and combinable" artifacts used to mobilize networks of ideas, persons, and technologies. Bruno Latour, Drawing Things Together, in REPRESENTATION IN SCIENTIFIC
PRACTICE 26 (Michael Lynch & Stephen Woolgar eds., 1988).
66. The legal literature on standardized contracts, for example, emphasizes that
standardized contracts facilitate "coordination" among the parties by focusing attention on certain "focal points" and allowing the parties to treat others as settled. Robert
B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate,104 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (2006); Choi & Gulati,
supra note 53. There are "network benefits" to standardized contracts whereby the
more parties use the contracts, the more standard they become and hence more valuable they become to all users. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 63, at 725.
67. The intuitive aesthetic appeal of this argument has much to do with a wider
modernist aesthetic of relationality. I have critiqued the aesthetics of networks in an
earlier monograph. See RILES, supra note 49.
68. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 5; Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Princi-

pled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 (3) INT'L ORG. 411 (1993);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 (5) FOREIGN AFF. 183 (1997).

69. See ALAN
(2d ed., 1993).

WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
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latability of these documents required the work of particular experts,
the documentation people. The institutional venue for the transplantation of this foreign legal regime to the Japanese market were the
meetings of a "documentation committee" of back-office staff from various Japanese and foreign banks sponsored by ISDA Tokyo. At these
meetings, back office staff discussed the details of form filling with an
aim to "standardize" and "create protocols" for form-filling, where the
terms of the forms laden with assumptions about market practices in
the American and British markets raised problems or made nonsensical assumptions in the context of the Japanese market. For example, the New York documents prescribed that collateral should be
transferred within three days, as was the practice in New York, but
at the time, neither the Japanese banks nor the clearing system for
Japanese Government Bonds maintained by the Bank of Japan was
sophisticated enough to achieve this. From documentation people's
point of view, the discontinuities between the bits and pieces of the
global network were as apparent and salient as the connections.
Likewise, commentators on private law have repeatedly commented on its scholastic quality and of the break between theory and
practice this scholasticism necessarily implies. 70 As an empirical
matter this break between the scholastic and private law worlds was
a central effect of the package of doctrines and documents that made
up collateral. Expertise consisted of two sides. Some experts, the
"more academic," prototypically, university professors, made theories. Others, "the practicing lawyers," completed documents. The documents and theories generated a bifurcated legal field-a field
characterized by divisions of status and expertise rather than
networked connections.
Moreover, to flatten out the distinction between theory and practice, and to see practical legal work as simply an instantiation of legal
theory and doctrine, that is, to see legal theorists and legal practitioners as working with one coherent network of legal concepts, overlooks the important practical work done by the distinction between
theory and material document in actual legal practice. Let me give
one concrete example of what I mean. Sometimes filling in the collateral forms presented what my informants described as "difficult
problems." Swap trading partners-foreign swap partners-wished
to have extensive rights concerning the collateral of Japanese banks
they held. 71 They wanted to be able to sell the collateral to a third
party, or again to use it as collateral of their own in future swap
70. See. e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT,
CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 5, 41 (2006).
71. INTERNATIONAL SWAPs AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, COLLATERAL SURVEY
105 (2000); Paul Avanzato, How to Use the Collateral.Carousel, 17 (1) INT'L FIN. L.

REV. 2 (1998).
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transactions. 72 And these "difficult problems" raised further questions of theory and doctrine. American and UK law allowed for this
so-called rehypothecation, but the law of Japan provided that the
holder of collateral had certain duties of care and hence could not
alienate the collateral without the permission of the party that had
initially posted it. 73 One threshold legal question therefore was what
country's law would govern the rights over collateral posted by a Japanese bank4 with an American bank, for example-Japanese or Amer7
ican law.

The full answer to this legal question involves complex and
murky jurisprudential and even epistemological issues (what law
should govern a transaction between a Japanese and UK bank,
posted to their subsidiaries in the Cayman Islands, involving a swap
of Chinese currency for Singaporean currency? And given that in
most legal systems the law traditionally attempts to answer such
questions in territorial terms, where did the transaction take place?
Where is the collateral, some numbers in some accounts, "held"?) But
the lawyers at ISDA headquarters in New York had prescribed a simple solution grounded not in legal theory but in concrete practices of
documentation. These lawyers had produced a "collateral annex" 75 to
the ISDA Master Agreement which included, among other things, a
clause specifying that the parties agreed in advance that all disputes
over collateral should be governed by either UK or New York law.
The form simply required documentation people to circle "law of New
York" or "law of the United Kingdom," to initial the document signaling their assent, and to file it. 7 6 In other words, the perception of a
72. Christian A. Johnson, Derivatives and Rehypothecation Failure - It's 3:00
p.m., Do you know where your collateral is?, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 949 (1997); Bill
Mapother, Get Double Duty from Collateral, 64(2) CREDIT UNION MAGAZINE 74 (1998).
73. JL 5
j:-s:t (tanpo keiyaku ni

okeru shouhitaishaku kousei to youshin no toraekata ni tsuite. A Method for understanding Pledges based on Loan and Set-off [Loan for Consumption, Return of the
Same Kind]).
74. See Guynn, supra note 27.
75. See ISDA COLLATERAL DOCUMENTATION WORKING GROUP, supra note 13; IN-

TERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC., GUIDELINES FOR COLLATERAL
PRACTITIONERS (1998); David Suetens, Collateralizationand the ISDA Credit Support
Annex, 14 (8) INT 'L FIN. L. REV. 15 (1995).

76. ISDA has attempted to address the private international law issues surrounding collateral by creating versions of its collateral agreement that are specifically tailored to the laws of the UK, New York, and Japan. In each of these versions, the
parties expressly affirm that they wish the law of the UK, New York or Japan to apply
to their transaction. In so doing, they rely upon a doctrine of private international law
that in matters of contract, the parties should be able to choose which law applies to
their transaction so long as it bears a reasonable relationship to the transaction. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 947 (3d ed. 2004). In Japanese law, this
principle is codified in the statute; Horei [Application of Laws General Act], Law No.
10 of 1898, art. 7(1), as amended: "As regards the formation and effect of a juristic act,
the question as to the law of which country is to govern shall be determined by the
intention of the parties.".
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difference between a document and a theory-even if all would agree
at another level of argument that the document is just an instantiation of a theory-"cut the network" 77 of legal theorizing. Sometimes
crude commonsense distinctions between the ontological status of
theories and objects have their practical uses. In this case, it provided
a way out of doctrinal debates which ISDA lawyers understood to be
endless.
From a broader theoretical vantage point, we could say much of
the same about the relationship between law and other forms of expertise in the financial markets. It is common in Weberian and science studies inspired work on markets to think about law as a form of
technocratic expertise, alongside economics. In this understanding,
lawyers are experts because they have access to a specialized body of
knowledge that allows them to make connections and serve as brokers of various kinds. The science studies literature emphasizes the
way disparate forms of expertise (such as law and finance) are able to
come together through material technologies such as documents that
translate between them. But this picture of smooth translatability
and collaboration between law and finance does not sit well with the
experience of the documentation people I knew. One of the features of
the work of the documentation people was that it locked them into a
relationship with a set of concepts, machines and persons which they
were acutely aware they did not understand-into a relationship premised on a lack of knowledge. As lawyers, they were intensely aware
that they did not understand the mathematical details of collateral
valuation, for example, nor did they understand the humans and machines that performed these calculations. And yet the work of documentation depended in concrete and ubiquitous ways on valuation.
And in fact this disconnect between traders and lawyers (later mandated by financial regulators who insisted, as part of market reforms,
that lawyers be physically moved to a different space, the "back office" where they might be even more independent from traders) was
precisely their added value within the institution. Part of what rendered the documentation people experts was their lack of knowledge
of certain aspects of the financial markets. I believe this is an observation that has some generalizability: in a global market in which
information overload is the taken for granted starting point, it is easy
to see how value is attributed to a practice that steps back, that
makes the picture simple by shutting out all the detail. 78 The market
value of private law, we might say, resides not so much in its ability
77. Marilyn Strathern, Cutting the Network, 2(3) J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGY INST.
517 (1996).
78. This is what makes legal knowledge technocratic in my view, for bureaucratic
work also begins from the premise of a certain lack of local knowledge. DOCUMENTS:
ARTIFACTS OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE

(Annelise Riles ed., 2006).
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to be networked with other forms of expertise as in its propensity to
cut itself off, to compartmentalize problems.
In place of networks of people, institutions, objects, experts, and
ideas that create coherent standards, new forms of transparency,
communities of expertise, and truths, one coherent doctrinal or sociological whole, then, we have pockets of lack of knowledge, breaks between theory and practice, genres of opacity, differences in
ontological status, lack of understanding of the agency and expertise
of others. We have a flurry of activity that creates distinctions, sets
limits, cuts one genre of thought and one line of analysis from another, activity that is not building anything in particular, that does
not "add up" to a new legal regime, or a new market sphere, or a new
source of epistemological or juridical authority. I call this "private
law as Anti-Network" to distinguish it from the range of pictures of
private law that focus on networks and connections of one kind or
another.
IV.

THE ANTI-NETWORK AND THE STATE

This brings me to the mutually derived legitimacy of private law
and the state. Most theorists of global private governance focus on
the emergence of a new set of parallel norms, customs, and rules, or a
new set of social relations, institutions and practices, outside the purview of the state, as a threat to the legitimacy of the state. But as we
saw, collateral is something quite distinct from a set of customs and
norms. It is a device for privately making the very need for norms go
away: global actors seek to take their disputes out of the hands of
national regulation and dispose of them before they ever come to be.
Ironically, there are certain parallels here with the knowledge
practices that constitute the state. The state is not just the expression of a set of political norms, nor is it just the institutionalization of
a set of communities, networked or otherwise. Neither is it a coherent
system. Rather, the practice of making distinctions, compartmentalizing, cutting off and setting limits is an exercise in creating and
manipulating legitimacy that has also long been one of the privileges,
and the contributions, the knowledge practices of the state. This is
what we mean by bureaucratization and proceduralism, the
hallmarks of the modern state-a set of scripts or routines for cutting
off, compartmentalizing, and hence channeling politics. Viewed from
this perspective, global private law is not a radical departure from
state law, but really more of the same.
The question of the legitimacy of both private law and the state
is usually addressed at a theoretical or political level of analysis, but
the above point suggests that it is worth addressing it at a very mundane techno-sociological level as well. That is, we may wish to think
of the production of legitimacy as a set of technical practices of com-
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munication and associated expectations. 79 For example, the materiality of ISDA forms, discussed above, plays a concrete role in the
private quality of collateral as a regime of global private governance.
Collateral then is a set of material and theoretical knowledge practices, a documentary regime that compels certain forms of legal collaboration according to carefully scripted routines, and that in turn
creates certain specific kinds of legitimacy.
The larger point I wish to make is this: the "threat" of private
law devices such as collateral to the state, if any, inheres in the way
they appropriate and redeploy the very knowledge practices that
characterize the modern state, not in the way they appeal to norms
outside or beyond these. We have then a condition in which the state
is not so much challenged as mirrored, reflected, and deflected in new
technical forms.

79. See LuHMANN, supra note 61, at 200.
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